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Day: Worker's Compensation - Constitutionality of Wyoming's Co-Employe
WORKER'S COMPENSATION-Constitutionality of Wyoming's co-employee
immunity statute under article 10, section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution. Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 (Wyo. 1982).

Early in the morning of November 3, 1977, at the AMAX
Coal Company's Belle Ayr Mine, a haul truck driven by
Dan Muirhead backed into another truck driven by Pamela
Sue Kendig. The collision crushed the cab of Kendig's truck,
pinning her inside and seriously injuring her legs. Kendig
filed suit against Muirhead and nine other co-employees alleging culpable and ordinary negligence in the operation of
the truck, the backing procedure used by Muirhead, and the
training and hiring of Muirhead. AMAX Coal Company was
dismissed from the suit as Kendig's employer 1 under Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act.2
The defendant co-employees moved to dismiss Kendig's
ordinary negligence claim,3 arguing that it was barred by
Section 27-12-103 (a) of the Wyoming Statutes,' which
grants co-employees immunity from suit unless they have
been "culpably" negligent.' Kendig responded to the motion
with the contention that the co-employee immunity statute
was unconstitutional."
The trial court agreed with Kendig and ruled that the
statute violated article 1, section 34 (an equal protection
guarantee); article 3, section 27 (also an equal protection
provision) ; and article 10, section 4 (the worker's compensaCopyrightc 1983 by the UnIversity of Wyoming.

1. Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1237 n.5 (Wyo. 1982).
2. WYo. STAT. §§ 27-12-101 to -805 (1977).
3. Defendants moved to dismiss all of Kendig's claims, both ordinary and
culpable negligence. Because the trial court ruled that Kendig could proceed on an ordinary negligence theory, the culpable negligence claim was
apparently abandoned.
4. WYO. STAT. § 27-12-103(a) (1977) states in part:
The rights and remedies provided in this act (worker's compensation) ...

are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against

any employer contributing as required by this act, or his employees
acting within the course of their employment unless the employees
are culpably negligent ....
5. The Wyoming Supreme Court has defined culpable negligence to mean
"willful and wanton misconduct," which is the same standard used to
determine the appropriateness of punitive damages. See Barnette v. Doyle,
622 P.2d 1349, 1361-62 (Wyo. 1981); Danculovich v* Brown, 593 P.2d 187,
194 (Wyo. 1979).
6. Brief for Appellee at 7, Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 (Wyo. 1982).
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tion enabling section) of the Wyoming Constitution.7 Kendig went to trial on an ordinary negligence theory, and the
jury awarded her a $330,000 verdict.'
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the
lower court and held that the co-employee immunity statute
did not deprive Kendig of equal protection of the law' or due
process" under the Wyoming Constitution. More importantly, the court did not find that the co-employee immunity
statute violated the constitutional provision which authorized the creation of a worker's compensation system, article
10, section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution." This Note will
examine these constitutional rulings with a particular emphasis on the practical and theoretical considerations raised
by the court's approval of co-employee immunity under article 10, section 4.12
WORKER'S COMPENSATION HISTORY AND THEORY

Worker's compensation in its present form was born
shortly after the turn of the century from a desire to ease
the problems caused by rapid industrialization and a century
of judicial decisions motivated by a laissez faire economic
7. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 34, states: "[A]Il laws of a general nature shall have
a uniform operation."
WYO. CONST. art. III, § 27 states in part: "The legislature shall not pass
local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases . . . for
limitation of civil actions . . . granting . . . to any individual . . . any
special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise .
WYo. CONST. art. X, § 4 states in part:
No law shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to be
recovered for causing the injury or death of any person. Any
contract or agreement with any employee waiving any right to
recover damages for causing the death or injury of any employee
shall be void. As to all extrahazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for the accumulation and maintenance
of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid compensation as
may be fixed by law . . . . The right of each employee to compensation from such fund shall be in lieu of and shall take the
place of any and all rights of action against any employer contributing as required by law to such fund.
8. Brief for Appellee, supra note 6, at 5.
9. 641 P.2d 1235, 1240 (Wyo. 1982).
10. Id. at 1241.
11. Id. at 1239.
12. Kendig also argued that the co-employee statute violated article 9, section
4 of the Wyoming Constitution. Neither Kendig nor the court gave this
provision, which relates only to mining operations, much attention. This
note will focus primarily on article 10, section 4 because it is unique to
Wyoming and presents an excellent opportunity to examine co-employee
immunity statutes in light of worker's compensation theory. Due process
and equal protection arguments are treated in other cases involving immunity statutes. See infra cases cited at notes 50 and 55.
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philosophy."3 Industrial enterprises such as railroads and
mining were involving growing numbers of workers in highly
dangerous occupations. As more and more workers were
being seriously injured or killed, nineteenth century common
law courts were simultaneously placing obstacles between the
injured worker and his ability to recover from his employer
in tort. Court-created doctrines such as assumption of risk,
contributory negligence and the fellow servant doctrine"
combined to effectively shield an employer from much of his
possible tort liability. 5 To compound the problem, employees
were often required to waive their right to sue as a condition
of employment,'" and rarely could the rest afford to finance
litigation or obtain personal injury insurance." By the time
mass production began to emerge in the industrial economy,
it was apparent that traditional tort recovery mechanisms
were not meeting the needs of the industrial worker."
Worker's compensation was the solution. Originally
adopted from the German system of social insurance," which
required both the employer and the employee to contribute to a
state administered fund, worker's compensation was adopted
by the state of New York in 1910 and spread quickly throughout the nation.20 Although worker's compensation as enacted
in this country differed significantly from the social insur13. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 4.30, 4.40 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]. For a lucid and brief discussion of worker's compensation history and theory, see 1 LARSON, §§ 1.00-5.30.

14. Id. at §§ 4.30, 4.40. The fellow servant doctrine allowed an employer to
allege that the negligence of another employee was responsible for the
injury to the worker, thus reducing or eliminating the employer's liability.
See Bennett v. Messick, 76 Wash. 2d 474, 457 P.2d 609, 610 (1969).
15. 1 LARSON, supra note 13, at § 4.40.
16. JOURNAL AND DEBATES OF THE WYOMING CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 44354, 614-16 (1889). See infra note 92.
17. The Washington Supreme Court has stated, for example, that: "To win
only after litigation, to receive the sum only after months or years of
delay, was to the comparatively indigent claimant little better than to get
nothing." Stertz v. Indus. Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 158 P. 256, 258
(1916).
18. In the first Wyoming case challenging the worker's compensation plan,
the court noted that "[t]he need for a change from the old unsatisfactory
system was felt by all. . .

."

Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo.

511, 173 P. 981, 991 (1918).
19. 1 LARSON, supra note 13, at § 5.10.
20. Id. at § 5.20.
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ance systems in Germany and Great Britain,21 it nevertheless
represented an entirely new form of compensation for the
injured employee. Tort recovery, with its elements of fault,
causation, proof and defenses, was completely replaced with
a form of industrial accident insurance." - Under the new
system, the employer agreed to pay the injured worker benefits regardless of fault, and the employee agreed to forego
common law tort actions against the employer, sparing the
employer large damage judgments.2"
This exchange of one right for another gives the compensation system many of the characteristics of a contractual
relationship. 4 In some states, for example, the employee has
the option of electing worker's compensation coverage or
retaining his common law cause of action against his employer. 5 These contract features illustrate some of the conceptual difficulties that arise when legislatures extend immunity to co-employees. Most worker's compensation systems as enacted addressed only the exchange of rights between employer and employee. The relationship between
employees was therefore not part of the original "contract"
between employer and employee."
Worker's compensation was designed to establish a system which would guarantee an injured worker at least a
part of his regular income.2 7 Employers would contribute
21. Unlike the German and British systems, American worker's compensation
plans are financed by contributions from employers only, thus making the
American system a form of private industrial insurance. See 1 LARSON,
supra note 13, at § 3.10.
22. Id. at § 2.00; Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d at 1238.
23. Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. at 989 (1918).
24. Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621, 624 (Wyo. 1974). The Markle court
stated: "To say that workmen's compensation in Wyoming is in the nature
of insurance is to say it stems from contract." Id.
25. See Halenar v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 27, 504 P.2d 928 (1972).
26. Article 10, section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, for example, does not
mention the relationship between employees. It is sometimes argued, however, that co-employees should be granted immunity for reasons similar to
third party beneficiaries:
The reason for the employer's immunity is the quid pro quo by
which the employer gives up his normal defenses and assumes
automatic liability, while the employee gives up his common law
right to verdicts. This reasoning can be extended to the tortfeasor
coemployee; he, too, is involved in this compromise of rights. Perhaps, so the argument runs, one of the things he is entitled to expect in return for what he has given up is freedom from common
law suits based on industrial accidents in which he is at fault.
2A LARSON, supra note 13, at § 72.22.
27. 1 LARSON, supra note 13, at § 2.20.
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to the fund and pass the cost to the consumer. This compensation system, it was hoped, would at least keep the wolf
from the worker's door without the necessity of carrying an
injured worker on the public dole."8
Two features of the worker's compensation system highlight the differences between traditional tort recovery and
the compensation system. First, the income-replacing objective of the fixed schedule of benefits is not meant to serve
the same function as tort damages. Worker's compensation
is not designed to make the injured worker whole, or in any
way redress him for pain and suffering.2 9 Second, worker's
compensation eliminates fault from influencing the worker's
right to recover. Unlike tort law, which requires a degree
of actionable fault in order for the worker to recover, worker's compensation pays a fixed amount of benefits whenever
a worker is disabled, regardless of the "cause" of the worker's
injury.30 This elimination of fault goes to the heart of the
contract between employer and employee-the employee gives
up damage recoveries in return for certain compensation.
Worker's compensation was a novel and progressive innovation designed to alleviate many of the problems which
accompanied traditional tort recoveries. Damages and concerns with fault were discarded and replaced with a form
of accident insurance. The distinct theoretical differences
between worker's compensation and the law of tort has not,
however, prevented considerable legislative and judicial confusion."1 Tort concepts continue to haunt worker's compensation law as lawmakers and judges remain unwilling to
part with a well-known friend.2 Meyer v. Kendig reflects
many of the problems created when courts and lawmakers
abandon the effort to maintain the theoretical integrity of
worker's compensation and allow notions of tort to invade
the system.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

§
§
§
§

3.10.
2.50.
2.10.
120.
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CO-EMPLOYEES UNDER PRIOR WYOMING LAW

Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act has always permitted an injured worker to pursue his "adequate remedy
at law" against any third-party tortfeasor3 Until In Re
Byrne 4 was decided in 1939, the tort liability of co-employees
was apparently never addressed in Wyoming. Considering
the question, the Byrne court looked to the history of worker's
compensation in Wyoming and held that the enactment of the
system eliminated the fellow servant rule, and, because it

did so, the legislature could not have intended that co-employees be subject to suit. 5 The Byrne decision apparently held

the stage until 1974, when the Wyoming Supreme Court in
Markle v. Williamson" expressly found that co-employees

were "third parties" and thus subject to negligence actions
brought by fellow employees."
The Markle court's resurrection of the employee's com-

mon law right to sue a co-employee prompted a swift response
from the state legislature. In 1975 the statute was amended
to extend immunity to co-employees unless they were "grossIn 1977 the statute was again amended to
ly" negligent.3
replace the "gross" requirement with "culpable."3 " The response of the Wyoming legislature to the Markle decision

was similar to actions taken by state lawmakers around the
country following similar judicial decisions, and probably

reflects a widespread belief that co-employees should enjoy
tort immunity."
33. This right was first codified in the original Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, 1915 WYO. SEss. LAWS Ch. 124., § 8. This right is now codified
at WYO. STAT. § 27-12-104 (1977).
34. 53 Wyo. 519, 86 P.2d 1095 (1939).
35. Id. at 1101-02.
36. 518 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 1974). The Markle court squarely addressed the question of whether co-employees were third parties and thus subject to suit.
The court apparently did not overrule Byrne, but the decision ran counter
to Byrne. For a discussion of these two cases, see Note, Liability of Fellow
Employees Under the Wyoming Workmen's Compensation Law, 10 LAND
& WATER L. RE. 263 (1975).
37. 518 P.2d at 625.
38. 1975 Wyo. SEss. LAWS Ch. 149., § 1.
39. WYO. STAT. § 27-12-103(a) (1977). See supra note 5.
40. See, e.g., Halenar v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 27, 504 P.2d 928 (1972),
followed by the enactment of ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (Supp. 1981).
See also Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d at 1238 n.11 (Wyo. 1982).
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MEYER V. KENDIG

The bulk of Kendig's challenge to Section 27-12-103 (a),
Wyoming's co-employee immunity statute, was predicated
on three constitutional provisions that Kendig argued must
prohibit a co-employee immunity statute.4 Essentially, Kendig contended that the statute violated equal protection and
due process guarantees, and, more specifically, exceeded the
power granted by the constitutional provision creating a
worker's compensation system, article 10, section 4. Equal
protection and due process challenges have been successful
in other jurisdictions," but Meyer v. Kendig is unique because it involves a constitutional provision that contains all
the theoretical elements of a worker's compensation scheme.
Because worker's compensation in Wyoming is therefore not
a statutory right, Kendig urged the court to consider article
10, section 4 as an explicit statement of the components of
worker's compensation, beyond which the legislature could
not go.4 '
Equal Protection
The immunity granted co-employees, in Kendig's view,
amounted to a special classification, a "status immunity"
that had no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. " She pointed out that co-employees, unlike employers,
had not contributed to the fund and therefore had done
nothing to deserve special treatment. The classification,
therefore, was arbitrary. 5 Kendig also advanced the policy
argument that co-employees would, given their immunity,
be less careful on the job. Further, negligent co-employees
by their torts would create a drain on the fund which would
not be replaced if the injured worker could not recover. 6
41. Brief for Appellee, supra note 6, at 27. Kendig's due proces argument was
based on WYo. CONST. art. I, § 8, which states in part: "All courts shall
be open and every person for an injury done to person, reputation or
property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or delay ......
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 49 and 54.
43. Brief for Appellee, supra note 6, at 17.
44. Id. at 21-26.
45. Id. at 25-26.
46. Id. at 25.
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The court, however, did not agree. Article 1, section 34
and article 3, section 27, stated the court, require only that
a statute operate alike on all persons similarly situated.4 7
Moreover the statute was, in the court's opinion, entirely
reasonable in light of the state's interest in preserving harmony among employees and in maintaining a financially
sound worker's compensation fund." Because the court felt
that the statute was neither arbitrary in its classification
nor unreasonable in its purpose, the statute did not deny
Kendig equal protection under article 1, section 34 and article 3, section 27 of the Wyoming Constitution. 9
Due Process
Kendig also contended that the co-employee immunity
statute violated article 1, section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution, which states: "All courts shall be open and every
person for an injury done to person, reputation, or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or
delay . . ." Although Kendig did not characterize this provision as granting a due process protection, 0 provisions similar to this have been found to preserve common law causes
of action." Because the co-employee immunity statute essentially eliminates a common law cause of action, Kendig
it deprived her redress for an "injury done to
argued that
' 52
person.
The court declined to view article 1, section 8 as granting the due process guarantees sought by Kendig. The court
47. 641 P.2d at 1240.
48. Id. at 1239. See infra note 68.
49. 641 P.2d at 1240. For a case presenting an equal protection challenge to a
co-employee immunity statute, see Perez v. Continental Casualty Co., 367
So. 2d 1284 (La. App. 1979), cert. denied, 369 So. 2d 157 (La. 1979).
50. Appellee characterized the provision as guaranteeing access to the courts.
Because a cause of action is eliminated by the co-employee immunity statute, Kendig argued, she had lost her access to the court for that injury.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 6, at 27. This is essentially an argument
that this provision preserves common law causes of action, and therefore
by eliminating a cause of action, the legislature has infringed on a substantive right. The court rejected this argument.
51. See Grantham v. Denke, 359 So. 2d 785 (Ala. 1978). Grantham involved a
constitutional provision very similar to the one involved in Meyer, and the
Grantham court ruled that this provision preserved common law causes of

action.
52. WYO.CONST. art. I., § 8. See supra note 49; infra note 54.
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held that article 1, section 8 did not preserve common law
causes of action:
The fact that the courts are required to be open and
to afford justice for injury done does not mean that
a party is assured of success in a legal action, or
that standards cannot be set for, and limitations
placed upon, causes of action-all in the interest of
justice."
The court thus considered the provision as a right of access,
rather than a right of action, provision." Because Kendig
had access to the courts, the co-employee immunity statute
did not violate article 1, section 8.
Article 10, section 4: worker's compensation enabling
provision
Co-employee immunity statutes have been challenged
primarly on due process and equal protection grounds, with
limited success." Meyer v. Kendig, however, offered the
court a unique opportunity to examine co-employee immunity
statutes in light of worker's compensation theory because
it involved a specific constitutional provision which established a theoretical framework for the creation of a worker's
compensation scheme." This provision, article 10, section 4,
as originally enacted stated:
No law shall be enacted limiting the amount of
damages to be recovered for causing the death or
injury of any person. Any contract or agreement
with any employee waiving any right to recover
damages for causing the death or injury of any employee shall be void."
53. 641 P.2d at 1241.
54. For cases mounting due process challenges, see Grantham v. Denke, 359 So.
2d 785 (Ala. 1978), Halenar v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 25, 504 P.2d 928
(1972).
55. See supra cases cited at notes 49 and 54.
56. The amendment to article 10, section 4, did more than merely authorize
the creation of worker's compensation. It specifically indicated the form
of the system and delineated the exchange of rights between employer and
employee. Because it does so, the provision provides an excellent opportunity to examine worker's compensation legislation against the theoretical
framework of the compensation system. See infra text accompanying note
59.
57. WYo. CONST. art. X, § 4.
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This language was seen as prohibiting the enactment of a
worker's compensation act.58 In 1914, the people of Wyoming passed an amendment to the section, leaving the first
two sentences intact and adding:
As to all extra hazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for the accumulation and
maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall
be paid compensation as may be fixed by law,...
The right of each employee to compensation from
such fund shall be in lieu of and shall take the place
of any and all rights of action against any employer
contributing as required by law to such fund .... ."
Because the language of the amendment contains the
essential structure of a worker's compensation system, Kendig argued that the section must be viewed as setting forth
the basic limits within which the legislature may enact laws
affecting worker's compensation.6 ° Because it is a constitutional provision, Kendig urged the court to recognize article 10, section 4 as an express limitation on the authority
of the legislature." If the section is indeed a limitation on
the power of the legislature, contended Kendig, then the
co-employee immunity statute was clearly unconstitutional
because the language of the amendment grants immunity
only to "any employer contributing." As the statute thus
prevents an injured employee from receiving damages from
a co-employee, Kendig reasoned that the statute amounted
to an unconstitutional "limitation" on damages, in violation
of the first sentence of the section. 2
The court prefaced its analysis of the constitutional
challenges made by Kendig by citing constitutional interpretation doctrines that require a court to resolve any doubt in
58. Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d at 625 (Wyo. 1974). The Markle court
was looking at the language of the 1914 amendment (see infra text accompanying note 59) to determine if co-employees were intended to be covered
by the immunity granted employers. Holding that co-employees were not
to be given immunity, the court observed that "[t]he amendment being in
1914 when industrial suits were quite infrequent, it would appear the
situation with respect to co-workers was not dealt with." 518 P.2d at 625.
59. WYO. CONST. art. X, § 4.
60. Brief for Appellee, supra note 6, at 16.
61. Id.
62. Id. For a case with similar reasoning, see Kilpatrick v. Superior Court,
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favor of an interpretation which preserves constitutional
validity. 3 Having determined to find an avenue which would
protect the validity of the co-employee immunity statute, the
court answered Kendig's arguments by noting the difference
between limiting damages, as prohibited by the first sentence
of the section, 4 and eliminating a cause of action altogether.
The court reasoned:
Section 27-12-103(a) does not limit the amount of
damages to be recovered. It limits the cause of
action available for a recovery. The fact that the
first sentence of Art. 10, § 4 relates only to the
amount of damages is exemplified by the second
sentence which pertains to the "right to recover." 5
Because the co-employee immunity statute merely eliminates
a cause of action, it does not fall within the prohibitions of
the first sentence of article 10, section 4. This, said the
court, was "determinative of the constitutionality of such
section insofar as Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution
is concerned." 67 The court went on to consider the policy
arguments supporting co-employee immunity and concluded
that to allow co-employees to be subject to suit "would subject
the Worker's Compensation Act to a doubtful future.""
105 Ariz. 413, 466 P.2d 18 (1970).
63. 641 P.2d at 1239.
64. Id.
65. Id. The basic holding of the Meyer court with respect to article 10, section 4
is that the complete elimination of a cause of action, in this case the right
to sue a co-employee for negligence, is not a limitation on damages. Thus,
while the legislature cannot limit damages in a recognized action, it can
eliminate the action altogether.
66. Unlike the constitutions of some states, the Wyoming Constitution apparently does not preserve common law causes of action. The common law is
applicable only when it has not been changed or eliminated by statute.
Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Wyo. 1975).
67. 641 P.2d at 1239.
68. Id. The policy arguments for co-employee immunity advanced by the court
include: harmony between employees, maintenance of a sound worker's
compensation fund, prevention of "hundreds of legal actions" and the fear
that a negligent cmployee would be required to pay some of the cost which
would normally have been the employer's responsibliity. Because the employee must reimburse the fund with proceeds recovered from a third
party, (see infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text) the negligent employee would thus indirectly be putting money back into the fund. If the
co-employee was not subject to suit, the employer would not have the benefits reimbursed. Brief for Appellee, supra note 6, at 23.
The policy arguments advanced by Kendig against co-employee immunity included theoretical inconsistency and removal of incentives for
careful work. Id. For a discussion of the impact on insurance of coemployee suits, see Marks, Erosion of the Exclusive Workers' Compensation Remedy: Suits Against Coemployees and Compensation Carriers, 17
FORUM 395 (1981).
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THE DISSENT

Chief Justice Rose filed a strong dissent. In his view:
the majority of the court have "once again" ignored
the original purpose of the Wyoming Worker's
Compensation Act by reaffirming the power of the
legislature to incorporate into the scheme elements
that were clearly neither contemplated nor intended
by the 1914 amendment to Art. 10, § 4.69
Justice Rose embraced the position advanced by Kendig that
article 10, section 4 is an explicit limitation on the power of
the legislature." He would have analyzed the co-employee
immunity statute's constitutionality by comparing the purpose of the statute with the theoretical underpinnings of
worker's compenastion as outlined by article 10, section 4.7'
If the statute did not come within the scope of the original
worker's compensation system, and if the statute is theoretically inconsistent with worker's compensation, Justice Rose
would find the statute to be beyond the authority granted
by article 10, section 4 and therefore unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Rose first outlined his views concerning
worker's compensation legislation in Stephenson v. Mitchell,"
a recent case examining the constitutionality of a statute
which required an employee to reimburse the compensation
fund out of the proceeds recovered from a third party tortfeasor 7 1 The Stephenson court upheld the statute, 4 and
Justice Rose dissented, contending that the language of
article 10, section 4 and the worker's compensation system
as originally enacted did not include the notion that an
employee would end up contributing to the fund. 5 In his
Meyer dissent, Justice Rose reasoned that requiring the
employee to reimburse the fund "embrae[ed] a concept which
says that the original benefits received from the fund were
69. 641 P.2d at 1244 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1247 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
71. Id. For a complete analysis of Justice Rose's approach, see his dissent in
Stephenson v. Mitchell, 569 P.2d 95, 110-12 (Wyo. 1977).
72. 569 P.2d 95, 100-112 (Wyo. 1977) (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
73. WYO. STAT. § 27-54 (1957) (current version at Wyo. STAT. § 27-12-104
(1977)).
74. 569 P.2d at 99.
75. Id. at 110 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
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in the nature of damages for a tortious injury,
rather than
76
insurance.
for
contract
a
for payment under
In both Stephenson and Meyer, Justice Rose dissented
because he perceived the statutes in question to be beyond
the limits inherent in the language of article 10, section 4.
In both cases, he argued, the statutes were theoretically inconsistent with worker's compensation and therefore they
"incorporate[d] elements into the scheme '"17 which were improper under article 10, section 4.
In support of his contention that worker's compensation
must be treated strictly as a form of industrial accident insurance,7 1 Justice Rose pointed to the history of worker's
compensation theory as developed in past Wyoming cases.
The constitutionality of worker's compensation was first
addressed in Wyoming in Zancanelli v. Central Coal and
Coke Company." The Zancanelli court reviewed worker's
compensation theory and observed that the tort system was
a failure with respect to compensating injured industrial
workers. 1 It was necessary, said the court, to institute an
entirely new system in the form of insurance benefits:
[Worker's compensation] is not intended to give
compensation as damages, but is more in the nature
of accident insurance . . . . In adopting the new
system both employees and employers gave up something that they each might gain something else, and
it was in the nature of a compromise ....."
Since Zancanelli, the Wyoming Supreme Court has consistently characterized worker's compensation as a form of
industrial accident insurance.8" In fact, the court has even
gone so far as to ignore statutory provisions inconsistent
with the industrial insurance concept. In In Re Byrne, the
76. 641 P.2d at 1246 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1244 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1246 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1245 n.3 (Rose, C.J., dissenting) (citing In Re Byrne, 53 Wyo. 519,
86 P.2d 1095 (1939), and Hotelling v. Fargo-Western Oil Co., 33 Wyo. 240,
238 P. 542 (1925)). See supra text accompanying note 34.
80. 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981.
81. Id., 173 P. at 989.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 1974), In Re Byrne,
53 Wyo. 519, 86 P.2d 1095 (1931).
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court examined a statute which provided that if an employee
had an action against a third party tortfeasor, the worker
could not receive compensation and was left solely to his
remedy at law against the third party.84 The statute effectively allowed an employer to raise the defense that he was
not at "fault." The Byrne court held that this statute was
completely inconsistent with worker's compensation theory,
and refused to give it effect. 5
Chief Justice Rose, like the court in Byrne, would have
ruled that the co-employee immunity statute is outside the
system established by article 10, section 4 and is therefore
unconstitutional.
This result, he argued, is supported by
Wyoming precedent, worker's compensation theory, and by
the specific language of article 10, section 4.87
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION

By holding that the co-employee immunity statute is
merely a legislative elimination of a common law cause of
action, the Meyer court side-stepped the issue of whether or
not article 10, section 4 is an express limitation on the power
of the legislature to enact laws affecting worker's compensation. It is also significant that there is no language in the
opinion addressing the co-employee immunity statute in light
of worker's compensation theory. The court's decision to uphold the statute is particularly significant because it follows
Justice Rose's Stephenson dissent.
Meyer v. Kendig, therefore, must be viewed as a determination by the court not to impose constitutional restrictions, under article 10, section 4, on the power of the legislature to enact laws which alter the basic components of Wyoming's worker's compensation system. It is not clear from the
opinion if the court is deliberately abandoning efforts to
maintain the theoretical integrity of the worker's compensation system, but the opportunity to reestablish theoretical
consistency was clearly before the court and it declined to do
84.
85.
86.
87.

1915 WYo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 124, § 8.
53 Wyo. 519, 86 P.2d at 1002.
641 P.2d at 1245, 1247 (Rose, C.J., dissenting)*.
Id. at 1244-47 (Rose, C.J., dissenting). -
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so. There are strong policy arguments both for and against
co-employee immunity,8 and the Meyer decision may therefore reflect a judicial reluctance to force a result contrary
to the position taken by the legislature.
If the court's primary objective was to uphold the constitutionality of the statute, then the observation that the
elimination of a cause of action is not a limitation on damages provides a facile means of saving the statute. The
theoretical problem with the court's analysis, however, is
that it ignores the contractual character of the industrial
accident insurance concept. The original worker's compensation scheme represented an exchange of rights between
employer and employee. The relationship between employees
was not covered in the "compromise" 9 between employer
and employee.
The theoretical inconsistency of co-employee immunity
statutes is obvious in states that make worker's compensation coverage optional.9 0 In such a state, for example, an
employee might decide to elect compensation coverage with
the understanding that he cannot sue his employer, but will
be assured compensation if he is injured. If the state legislature then passes a statute granting co-employee immunity
from suit, an element is added to the system that was
not present when the worker contracted into compensation
coverage.
The Wyoming worker does not have the option to elect
compensation coverage. Far from making co-employee immunity statutes less theoretically anomalous, the lack of
choice present in Wyoming's system should strengthen the
argument that article 10, section 4 is a limitation on the legislature. Because the Wyoming worker does not have the option to select coverage, the court's refusal in Meyer to construe article 10, section 4 as a limitation leaves the worker
88. See supra note 68.
89. Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. at 542, 173 P. at 989
(1918). The Zancanelli court noted: "In adopting the new system, both
employds and employers gave up something that they each might gain
- something-else, and it was in the nature of a compromise. . . .. Id.
90. See, e.g., Halenar v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 27, 504 P.2d 928 (1972).
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with almost no protection outside the political process. When
the legislature acts to alter basic components of the scheme,
the bargain between employer and employee is changed. With
the co-employee immunity statute, for example, the worker
loses a common law right without any reciprocal "consideration." Thus, the contractual character of worker's compensation is destroyed.
Ironically, under the Meyer rationale, the 1914 amendment to article 10, section 4 was never necessary. The section, as noted above, was originally enacted to protect employees from signing away their tort rights as a condition
of employment. 1 It was the framers' belief that a section
prohibiting such contracts would stop the abuse of workers'
rights. The clear implication of the debates over this provision is that it was concerned with tort actions and tort
damages.
Worker's compensation benefits, however, are not tort
damages. The fixed schedule of benefits is not designed to be
compensation for damages, it is compensation for lost income.
Worker's compensation is therefore not a limitation on damages, as that word is used in the first sentence of article 10,
section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.
The Meyer court held that the legislature, in enacting
the co-employee immunity statute, simply eliminated a cause
of action. If the 1914 legislature had used this rationale, it
could have eliminated the employee's common law cause of
action against his employer, then passed a worker's compensation act to take its place. This action would not have conflicted with article 10, section 4 because the benefits of
91. Supra note 16. Mr. Thomas Reed stated:
As I understand this, this [article 10, section 4] is to reach
what we originally call the old ironclad agreement. I can see the
object of this because I have worked on all the railroads west of
Chicago I might say, and they have all adopted a policy that this
here touches upon. It was called the ironclad agreement, by which
a man when he entered the employ of the company agreed to release the company from all liability for any accident that might
occur to him, no matter whether the fault was directly traceable
to the company or not.

JOURNAL OF THE DEBATES OF THE WYOMING CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,

6upra note 16, at 447.
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worker's compensation are not damages and the elimination
of a cause of action is not a limitation on damages.
Issues are likely to arise in connection with worker's
compensation that have not yet been addressed in Wyoming.
Under Wyoming's comparative negligence system,9" for example, each negligent party must be assigned a percentage
of fault in a negligence action.93 No doubt a third-party
tortfeasor will someday attempt to require contribution from
a negligent employer. The resolution of the problem would
be clear if it is analyzed in light of worker's compensation
theory. The employer has already contracted out of liability
to the employee, so the basic requirement for contribution is
not present." Because the Meyer decision effectively grants
the legislature a free hand, however, there might be no way
to prevent the legislature from passing a law requiring an
employer to make contribution. Article 10, section 4 has
lost its teeth.
CONCLUSION

Following the Meyer and Stephenson decisions, article
10, section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution can no longer be
viewed as a limitation of the authority of the legislature to
enact laws affecting worker's compensation. The extension
of immunity to co-employees eliminates a cause of action
which would otherwise have been available. Ironically, the
worker's compensation system was enacted because workers
had been steadily losing their ability to recover in tort.
Even though the legislature is now free to alter worker's
compensation as easily as if the system had been created by
statute, the court should be sensitive to arguments urging
theoretical consistency. Undoubtedly, issues concerning worker's compensation will arise which are not addressed in the
92. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977).
93. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1178-79 (Wyo. 1981).
94. For a discussion of indemnity and contribution problems involving worker's
compensation, see Note, Exclusivity Provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act as a Bar to Third-Party Actions Against Employers, 14 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 587 (1979); Note, The Third Party's Right to Contribution
from an Employer Covered by Workmen's Compensation, 56 N.D.L. REV.
373 (1980).
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statutes. In resolving these questions, the court should consider the theoretical parameters established by article 10,
section 4 and, in doing so, the court can avoid the complete
dissolution of worker's compensation as it was originally
enacted.
PATRICK R. DAY

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/10

18

